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Avionics Reliability Considerations for
Autonomous Reusable Launch Vehicles
J. Ned Yelverton
Principal Engineer
Loral Space Information Systems, Houston, Texas
Abstract
This paper will examine and trade various unique aspects and issues associated
with the avionics reliability necessary for autonomous operation of future reusable
space launch vehicles.
Introduction and Background
The requirement for unmanned autonomous launch vehicles, such as the currently
planned Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV/X-33), poses interesting problems for the
avionics system--where the intelligence must reside to provide the necessary (and
essential) automatic operations under all conditions of flight, environments, and
anomalous/degraded conditions of the vehicle. The avionics system must be robust
from a fault-tolerance point of view, which must include and incorporate new
flight/launch rules that will permit a “launch-with-failures” (if project cost goals are
to be met).
Key Launch Vehicle Requirements–Avionics Perspective
In order to accommodate “faults-at-launch” conditions, the onboard avionics
must be highly redundant, if designed based on classical configurations, which may
create a significant cost issue. The alternative is to employ other state-of-the-art
techniques for fault recovery or circumvention. This scenario presents a spectrum of
solutions that range from traditional replication (redundancy is increased until the
fault quantity is adequately covered) up to more sophisticated approaches for
reconfiguration using switching of spares and automatic reconfiguration.
In order to fully understand the above reliability requirements, critical phases of
and
launch/boost/ascent
mission
must
the
be
considered---with
deorbit/reentry/landing generally considered to be the most demanding times,
followed closely by in-orbit operations in close proximity (or in contact) with other
orbiting structures and vehicles.
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The following unique requirements goals may be established for a next
generation reuseable launch vehicle:
• Autonomy

• Re-Use
• Launch-with-Fault (One or more)
• Mission Fault-Tolerance

• L + M Minimum = 3

• (Total) No Person-in-the-Loop
• Intelligence must reside truly OnBoard
• Reliable return for rapid turnaround
for another mission
• Start mission with a penalty
• L = Launch Faults ( L = 1, 2,... )
• Two or more with continuation of
mission functions
• M = Mission Faults ( M =2, 3,... )
• The sum of launch and mission
faults.

All of the above requirements will impact avionics system redundancy and
reliability in the following ways:
• Must have enough redundancy and/or spares to tolerate the implied
(L + M) faults---too much equipment, however, will degrade the
results ( a diminishing returns issue),
• No person will be actively in the loop to assist in real-time decisions
on fault-downs and/or backup switching,
• Cost, weight, and power are impacted if brute force approaches are
taken.
Avionics Reliability Requirements--Implied and Assumed
The following characteristics will be used in this paper to assess the issues
associated with the avionics configuration necessary to perform the launch vehicle
mission:
• Launch Vehicle--Success greater than 1 out of 1000 missions --0.999
minimum reliability per mission,
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• Avionics reliability to be greater than 0.99999--( 100 X)--Avionics
must not contribute to the unreliability of the vehicle,
• L+M=3
• Typical integrated avionics set--one simplex set (or string) with the
following capability,
1. Simplex--one of each avionics function residing in CPU, 1/0,
GN&C (including integrated GPS/INS), Air System, Comm, etc.,
2. Assume a 5 box set for the above---average box MTBF = 25,000
hours,
3. String failure rate (λ ) = ( 5 / 25,000),
4. String reliability = 0.953 for a 10 day ( 240 hour) mission.
Avionics Configuration--Redundancy Assessment
A fault-masking avionics configuration, implemented with strings of the avionics
described in the previous section will provide the following capability:
Configuration
3 String TMR
4 String Quad
5 String Pentad

Faults Covered
1
2
3

End Configuration
Reliability
XOO
0.994
XXOO
0.9996
XXXOO
0.99998 (Meets)
(X= faulted)
(O = operational)

The following conclusions may be drawn from the above analysis:
• Five (5) strings of avionics are required to satisfy the minimum fault
coverage requirement ( L + M),
• Five (5) strings will just meet (approximately) the avionics system
reliability for the full 240 hour mission---will exceed requirements
if the criticality duty-cycle is considered.
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Fault-Down Rule Considerations
The previous analysis assumed fault-down to a dual configuration, still
operational in a mission abort situation. If the ability to isolate down to simplex is
considered, which requires isolation of the faulty unit after a dual miscompare, then
the following results:
Configuration
3 String TMR
4 String Quad

Fault Quantity
2
3

Reliability
0.9999
0.999995
(Exceeds)

Comments
Meets L+M Min.

These results show that fault-down to simplex permits implementation with a 4
string (Quad) system--a drop back from 5 to 4 strings. The risk involved with this
approach, however, which deviates from transparent fault-masking, is the reliability
and time involved to perform the isolation of the faulty unit after the dual
miscompare occurs.

Switched Redundancy Considerations
Switched redundancy, based on the following rules, was investigated to
determine if improvements could be achieved:
• Always have at least TMR active to mask one fault as it occurs,
• Switch in a new member and drop the faulty unit after each fault,

Results showed that reliability of each configuration was essentially boosted
approximately 10 X , effectively achieving an additional “virtual” string. The Quad
system could achieve close to the required system reliability of 0.99999:
• Reliability of Quad (3 + 1)= 0.99998 (close to requirement),
• Reliability of Pentad (3 +2)= 0.999998 (exceeding requirement).
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Conclusions from analysis of this technique were as follows:
•

Improves reliability significantly (spares have near zero
failure rate), but not fault coverage,

•

Carries the risk associated with switching complexity, and the
recovery time involved with bringing cold spares into the
redundant system.

Other Considerations
Numerous other popular fault-tolerance and redundancy methods were examined
for compliance with the launch vehicle avionics requirements under consideration.
A synopsis of some of these studies is given below:
1. A combination of Switching and Fault-Down to Simplex
•

Further enhances reliability, but with no additional fault
coverage (essentially not enough physical assets),

• Adds complexity for managing power switching and isolating
single failed units.
2. Fault Containment Regions
• Increases the average fault coverage by approximately half
the number of containment regions,
• Worst case---no better than straight-line independent strings.
3. Pair-of-Pairs Approaches
• Technique is based on dual compare--disagreement detection-switch to a standby/backup unit or system,
• Recovery (switch-over) time is involved, which must be less
than the critical recovery time of the control system,
• Management of switched resources is required,
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• Fault coverage is no greater than that for fault masking;
reliability is less due to the comparison and switchover
hardware.

Recommendations
The following recommendations for launch vehicle avionics results from the
analyses considered in this paper:
1. An independent/isolated avionic string approach with real-time
fault-masking (inherent recovery, inherent isolation, and zero
recovery time)--isolated strings simplify configuration for testing,
checkout, and health-management purposes,
2. Consider power and reliability enhancements with power switching--will need switching for reduced avionics capability during noncritical mission phases (will not improve fault coverage, however),

Observations and Conclusions
With the reliability available from the current (and projected) generation of
avionics technology, it appears that system redundancy will be primarily driven by
the fault coverage requirements ( L + M ) and not the system reliability. This is
especially true in cases, as in this paper, where the fault coverage is high, and
includes inherent faults at the start of the mission. Configuration schemes designed
to cover L + M faults will yield resulting system reliability numbers exceeding a
requirements level that might otherwise be entirely adequate for the project.
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